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The paper presents an overview of the recently created regulatory agencies 
in Turkey and assesses their formal (statutory) independence using a 
standard index. Independent regulatory agencies are characterized by 
organizational features that are very different than those of the traditional 
bureaucratic structures in Turkey. The independence scores calculated for 
Turkish regulatory agencies indicate that most of them were granted 
considerable operational and financial independence when they were 
created. Assessing their independence characteristics provides valuable 
insight on how the course of liberalization that Turkey started on at the 
beginning of 1980s have played itself out in the area of regulatory policy. 
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Introduction 
 
Liberalization policies that have been affecting developed as well as developing economies 
since the beginning of 1980’s have brought about important changes in the way the state has 
exercised control over the economy. An important aspect of liberalization policies has been 
the retreat of the state from utility (infrastructure) sectors, where a public firm typically used 
to be the monopoly producer. Utility sectors have typically been characterized by market 
failures, such as natural monopoly conditions in production, that prevent competitive markets 
from emerging and/or working efficiently, which had been the rationale behind public 
monopolies in these sectors. On the other hand, the retreat of the state from production in 
these sectors has been accompanied with the introduction of policies that aim at “regulating” 
the newly liberalized markets, albeit with less intrusive instruments. This is part of a more 
general shift in terms of the role of state in the economy. Instead of policies that focus on 
stabilization and redistribution at the macroeconomic level, regulation (but not direct control) 
of economic activity at the micro, or sector, level has come to forefront (Majone 1996a, 
1996b, 1997). 
 
One of the prominent features of this shift to regulatory policies has been the creation of 
specialized independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). IRAs are different from standard 
bureaucratic structures. They are administrative entities that are created by special laws, and 
they typically have separate legal personalities. IRAs can have very different powers that 
range from simple information provision to full competency on the regulatory process 
(including rule-making and adjudicative powers) in a specific area of activity. By design, 
they are insulated from direct (political) control by the executive. Such agencies have been 
created not only in former state run utility sectors, but also to cover a wide range of issues, 
such as competition policy, consumer protection, and food safety. 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of IRAs in Turkey with a view to 
assessing their independence characteristics. IRAs are characterized by organizational 
features that are very different than those of the traditional bureaucratic structures in Turkey, 
and examining how they came into existence and assessing their independence characteristics 
provides valuable insight on how the course of liberalization that Turkey started on at the 
beginning of 1980s have played itself out in the area of regulatory policy. 
   2
After a prolonged period of economic and political turmoil in the second half of 1970s, 
Turkey set on a course of market-oriented reforms at the end of 1979, which was a 
fundamental break with the country’s étatist past.
1 Reform of the trade regime stood at the 
core of the reform program. This involved commitment to a more flexible exchange rate 
policy and abandoning of import substitution policies through promotion of exports as well as 
liberalization of imports. Another main objective of the 1980 reform was to reduce the size of 
the public sector and to allow more freedom to private initiative and markets in determining 
resource allocation in the economy. Privatization of state-owned enterprises and liberalization 
of financial markets were conceived as two very important aspects of this process.
2 
 
The 1980 reforms brought about profound changes in the incentive structure economic actors 
faced and in the way they did business. Export promotion policies created a new set of 
incentives, especially for the manufacturing industry and the share of manufacturing in 
exports has dramatically increased within a rather short period of time. Financial 
liberalization have also been by and large achieved, especially with the liberalization of the 
current account in 1989. However, privatization of state-owned firms, an aim announced as 
one of the pillars of the reform program of 1980, started in 1986 but has not made headway 
up until very recently. The privatization experience of Turkey in 1980s and 1990s can be 
described at best as mediocre, as restructuring of most of the utility-like sectors, such as 
telecommunications and electricity, with large state-owned firms were not fully accomplished 
during this period.
3 Turkey's meagre performance in privatization in 1980s and 1990s largely 
draws from its failure to institute and implement an effective regulatory framework, including 
a well functioning competition policy. 
 
The appearance of IRAs in the Turkish institutional scene has occurred in the aftermath of 
developments briefly reviewed above. Although their first appearance goes back to beginning 
of 1980s, their proliferation has taken place in the 1990s and the 2000s.
4 As we will present 
in more detail below, except for instituting the Capital Markets Board in 1981 as a semi-
                                                 
1 The military regime that seized power in 1980 at the height of the crisis continued with the reform program. 
2 For reviews of Turkey’s liberalization policies, see Öniş and Riedel (1993), Togan (1994), and Togan and 
Balasubramanyam (1996). 
3 The privatization of telecommunications sector have by and large been completed as of 2007; however, state 
dominated structure in electricity sector still prevails. For a detailed review of Turkey’s privatization experience 
between 1986 and 1998, see Karataş (2001). 
4 In fact, this is the period during which proliferation of IRAs have been witnessed in a considerable number of 
emerging economies. For analysis of spread of IRAs in emerging economies 1990s, see Sosay and Zenginobuz 
(2005).   3
independent agency mandated to develop, regulate, or supervise capital markets, Turkey paid 
little or no attention to establishing an effective regulatory framework in the 1980s. The 
importance of instituting a regulatory framework prior to liberalization and privatization of 
industries has finally been realized and legislation has been passed to this effect only towards 
the end of 1990s. Moreover, this only came after years of stagnant economic conditions and 
only in the aftermath of the Southeast Asian and the Russian crises of 1997 and 1998 that 
exacerbated some of the very important structural problems the Turkish economy had failed 
to address. 
 
Creation of IRAs in Turkey
5 
 
There are currently nine public entities in Turkey that concur with a broad definition for 
IRAs.
6 In the order of their date of establishment, these are Capital Markets Board (1981), 
The Higher Board for Radio and Television (1994), Competition Agency (1994), Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (1999), Telecommunications Agency (2000), Energy 
Markets Regulatory Agency (2001), Sugar Agency (2001), Tobacco, Tobacco Products, and 
Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation Agency (2002), and Public Procurement Agency 
(2002). 
 
Capital Market Board (CMB) is the first public body that was established in Turkey with the 
broad traits of a bona fide IRA. It was established in 1981 in conjunction with the enactment 
of Capital Market Law No. 2499, which provided the legal framework for the establishment 
of an official capital market. CMB was given the task of establishing and developing capital 
markets and instituting an effective regulatory framework that would protect the rights of all 
investors and other parties involved. It was established as a public legal entity in its own right 
and given the authority to make decisions independently. However, in terms of the Turkish 
administrative law, it was a body considered as “related” to the Ministry of Finance. 
 
According to Turkish Constitution, Turkish administrative structure is unitary in nature in the 
sense that the executive branch is to be considered as constituting a whole in relation to all 
                                                 
5 For overviews of various aspects of IRAs in Turkey, see TÜSİAD (2002), Sönmez (2004). For international 
comparisons among IRAs in various developed and other countries, see Zenginobuz (2002). 
6 To qualify as an IRA an agency should derive its own power and responsibilities from an act of law, it must 
have an organizational structure completely separate from ministries (in the sense of being neither appointed nor 
managed directly by elected officials), and it must have at least a certain level of financial independence.   4
central and other (decentralized) administrative units constituting the state. Therefore, a strict 
indivisibility of administration is envisaged, and even the agencies with separate public legal 
personality are considered as being under the tutelage control of the center (Sönmez, 2004; 
179). In the case of agencies created with their own public legal personality, the indivisibility 
of administration is established by “relating” the agency to a (related) Ministry. 
 
The status of relatedness constitutes an obvious violation of notion of independence for an 
IRA. To get around this issue the IRA’s that are established later were declared as being 
“affiliated” to a Ministry rather than being related to it. This was a creative piece of 
lawmaking as there is no previous mention of this notion in the Turkish administrative law. In 
fact, critics argue that the Turkish Constitution does not allow room for such a notion.
7 
 
A consequence of CMB’s initial related status was to carry out inspections of entities that 
operated in capital markets if, and only if, when requested by the Ministry of Finance. It 
could take action against infringements of the law, and impose sanctions on entities involved 
only with the approval of the Ministry. The considerable power of control exercised by the 
Ministry of Finance over the operations of CMB was ended through two extensive 
amendments of Capital Market Law No. 2499 that were enacted in 1992 and 1999.
8 With 
these changes CMB became the sole authority with the power to regulate, supervise, and 
sanction in the capital market. Hence, it would be fair to say that CMB became a bona fide 
IRA only in 1999. CMB is now “affiliated” with a Ministry of State within the Prime 
Ministry instead of being “related” to the Ministry of Finance and enjoys full administrative 
and financial independence. 
 
The Higher Board for Radio and Television (HBRT) was established in 1994 as a regulatory 
body following the ending of state monopoly in radio and television broadcasting in 1993.
9
 
HBRT was created as an independent body with its own public legal personality to regulate, 
oversee, and sanction all entities involved in broadcasting. Its powers extend over technical 
aspects of broadcasting (such as frequency plannning) as well as regulation of competition in 
the broadcasting market. Moreover, HBRT is responsible for overseeing the content of 
material broadcasting and has the power to sanction against illegal and “immoral” content 
                                                 
7 See Tan (2000) for a discussion of the place of IRAs in Turkish administrative law. 
8 The Law No. 3749 of 1992 and the Law No. 4487 of 1999. 
9 The Law No. 3984 of 1994. The Law No. 2709 of 1993 involved the constitutional amendment of the Article 
133 of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic.   5
(ranging from temporary shutting down of stations to cancellation of broadcasting licenses). 
The procedure for nominating as well as appointing the nine Board members went through a 
number of changes, but in all cases both of these functions have been carried out by the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
 
Competition Agency (CA) is the body responsible for implementing the Turkish Competition 
Law, which was enacted in 1994.
10 Competition Board, the decision making organ of the CA 
responsible for the enforcement of Competition Law, was not appointed until February 1997 
and finally began its operations in November 1997. Competition Board comprises of 11 
members. Various ministries and other governmental and non-governmental bodies nominate 
two candidates for each position and the Council of Ministers appoints one out of each two 
nominees as a member for a term of six years. The Competition Law grants full financial and 
administrative autonomy to CA, and it stipulates explicitly that CA is not subject to 
instructions and orders of any other governmental body, including the Council of Ministers 
that appoints the members of the Competition Board. 
 
The enactment of the Competition Law and the establishment of CA have largely been due to 
Turkey's obligation under the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European 
Economic Community, the European Union (EU) as formerly called, to enact and implement 
a competition policy.
11 The Association Agreement requires that the parties should apply the 
provisions of Rome Treaty for the harmonization of their laws, tax rules, and competition 
policies. Pursuant to the agreement reached at the Association Council meeting of March 
1995, Turkey and the EU finally created a customs union starting January 1, 1996.
12 This 
agreement required that Turkey undertook all necessary measures to enact and effectively 
implement the competition law and policies of the EU. Thus, enactment of Turkish 
Competition Law was a prelude on Turkey’s part to the signing of the customs union 
agreement with EU. 
 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established in June 1999 in 
conjunction with the enactment of Law of Banking No. 4389 that brought about significant 
restructuring of the Turkish banking industry. Turkish banking industry had been ailing all 
                                                 
10 Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition of 1994. 
11 The Association Agreement was signed in Ankara on September 12, 1963 and became effective on December 
1, 1964. 
12 Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council.   6
throughout the 1990s, primarily due to distorted incentives it faced in the chronically high 
and erratic inflationary environment, which went together with increasing government 
deficits. Together with the slackening of entry requirements to the sector and the overall 
weakness of the regulatory framework, this environment contributed to the fragmentation of 
the banking sector into small banks. A significant number of small banks carrying weak asset 
portfolios became insolvent over time and had to be transferred to the Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund (SDIF), which at the time was being managed by the Turkish Central Bank.
13 
 
That the Turkish banking sector was in the verge of a crisis became apparent by 1997 and a 
sweeping restructuring of the banking sector was demanded by both the IMF and the World 
Bank as a precondition for extension of further loans. The restructuring of the regulatory 
framework in the banking industry started in 1999 with the new banking law mentioned 
above, which, among other significant changes, mandated the creation of BRSA. The 
restructuring process sector was certainly a very painful one and it was further execerbated by 
two very severe banking crises, namely those of November 2000 and February 2001. 
 
There was no official standby agreement with the IMF at the time BRSA was created, but 
both the passing of the new banking law as well as the establishment of BRSA were to a large 
extent carried out under the urging as well as guidance of the IMF. When Turkey finally 
signed a standby agreement with the IMF in December 1999, an official pledge to further 
broaden BRSA’s mandate, to amend its independence status as well as to enhance the 
transparency of its operations were put in writing in the associated letter of intent.
14 Several 
acts of law were then passed between 1999 and 2002 to amend various clauses of Law of 
Banking No. 4389 to carry out these promises.
15 At the end, BRSA became the single 
regulatory and supervisory agency to oversee the sector, and it was given independent 
jurisdiction over the entry and exit of banks and over changes to the regulatory framework. 
 
The disinflation program of 2000 carried out under the tutelage of the IMF involved not only 
tight fiscal and monetary policies as well as a pre-determined exchange rate to serve as a 
nominal anchor in reducing inflation from its chronically high levels, but also large-scale 
                                                 
13 SDIF was established in 1983. The Turkish Central Bank had managed SDIF from its inception until 2000, at 
which time it was transferred to the then newly founded BRSA. 
14 See the Strengthening the banking system and banking regulation section of the letter of intent dated 
December 19, 1999, submitted to IMF. Available online at: http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/sb_english. 
15 The Law No. 4491 of December 1999, the Law No. 4672 of May 2001, and the Law No. 4743 of January 2002 
all contained amendments to Law of Banking No. 4389.    7
structural reforms, especially complete privatization of state-owned firms in utility sectors, 
such as telecommunications and electricity. Establishment of a new legal and regulatory 
framework for utility sectors accompanied these recommendations. Independent regulatory 
agencies were recommended for all utility sectors to be privatized. 
  
In fact, the establishment of BRSA marked the onset of a wave of new IRAs in a number of 
industries. BRSA started its operations in 2000. Also in 2000, a new act to liberalize the 
telecommunications sector was enacted and an IRA was established to regulate the industry. 
Finally, two different acts were enacted for the liberalization of electricity and natural gas 
industries in 2001, and an IRA was established to oversee the performance of both of these 
industries.  
 
Telecommunications Agency (TA) was established in 2000 through the enactment of the Law 
No. 4502 and it started its operations within the same year. The establishment of TA as an 
IRA in charge of regulating the Turkish telecommunication industry followed an official 
undertaking by the Turkish government to privatize its state-owned monopoly 
telecommunications operator and liberalize its telecommunications market as part of a credit 
agreement with the World Bank in 2000.
16 Previously, regulatory powers in the 
telecommunications industry were partly exercised by the Ministry of Transportation and 
partly by Türk Telekomünikasyon A.Ş., the state-owned monopoly operator. 
 
As in the case telecommunications sector, the establishment of IRAs for the electricity and 
natural gas (energy) sectors was part of an official pledge made by the Turkish government to 
restructure and liberalize its electricity market in a credit agreement signed with the World 
Bank in 2000.
17 Initially, a separate IRA for the electricity market, Electricity Market 
Regulation Agency, was created by the Electricity Market Law No. 4628 in February 2001 to 
regulate the electricity sector. However, before its Board members were appointed, it was 
transformed into a joint regulator for the energy sector as a whole and named Energy Markets 
Regulatory Agency (EMRA) in April 2000 with the enactment of Law No. 4646 on the 
regulation of natural gas market. EMRA became operational in November 2001 and it has 
since been the sole authority responsible from regulation and supervision of all energy 
                                                 
16 See the Telecommunications Reform section of the Letter of Development Policy submitted by the Turkish 
Government to World Bank 2000. Available online at: http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/erl_ldp_ing.htm. 
17 See the Energy Reform section of the Letter of Development Policy submitted by the Turkish Government to 
World Bank 2000. Available online at:  http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/erl_ldp_ing.htm.   8
markets in Turkey. Previously the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources was the body 
that carried out these tasks. 
 
Turkey stands out as a special case where two IRAs were created two regulate agricultural 
markets. Sugar beet and tobacco are two important crops for the Turkish agriculture industry. 
A large number of farmers and their families in different parts of Turkey earn their living 
through production of these crops. Agricultural support policies that Turkish governments 
have traditionally undertaken with a view to securing votes in elections have largely been 
seen as a very important contributor to the mounting public debt. Consequently, IMF and the 
World Bank have both stipulated replacement of distortionary price supports in the 
agricultural sector with direct cash support to farmers. They also demanded serious reforms 
for the sector, including privatization of the state-owned sugar and tobacco production 
facilities. 
 
In a series of letters of intent signed as part of standby agreements, Turkish government has 
indeed promised to do away with price supports for sugar beet and tobacco and privatize the 
state-owned sugar and tobacco factories with the aim of liberalizing these markets.
18 There is, 
however, no mention of establishing IRAs for these sectors in the letters of intent. The 
creation of IRAs to regulate the markets for these two important crops seems to have aimed at 
compensating for the discontinuation of the state’s direct presence in these two markets 
where the livelihood of a large number of families have depended for a very long time on 
subsidies through price supports. In this regard, it looks more like the choice of the Turkish 
government itself rather than an imposition by IMF or the World Bank. As we will see below 
when formal independence scores are presented for IRAs in Turkey, the overall structure and 
certain aspects of agricultural IRAs are markedly different than the IRAs established for non-
agricultural sectors, with less independence from government’s influence in terms of 
decision-making and financial matters. 
  
Sugar Agency (SA) was established in 2001 by the Law No. 4634 and started its operations in 
the same year. Its Board members are appointed by the Council of Ministers from among 
nominations by various Ministries, sugar producers’ cooperatives and private sugar product 
                                                 
18 Structural reform sections of letters of intent dated December 18, 2000; January 30, 2001; May 3, 2001; June 
26, 2001; July 31,2001; January 18, 2002; April 3, 2002; and June 19,2002 all refer explicitly to the need for 
support policy reform for these crops and to privatizing state-owned production facilities involving these crops 
(all letters are available at http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/imf_standbyeng.htm).   9
manufacturers. In contrast to other IRAs, the Board members for SA are allowed to continue 
with their existing jobs. In fact, most of the members appointed for the Board were state 
employees in other state offices and continued with their work in their primary positions 
during their tenure at SA. Another interesting aspect of the structure of SA is the conditional 
sunset clause in the Law No. 4634. The clause stipulated that SA may be discontinued at the 
end of 2004 unless otherwise mandated by a decree of the Council of Ministers. In fact, the 
current government let the sunset clause become effective at the end of 2004 and, therefore, 
SA is currently extinct.
19 
 
Tobacco, Tobacco Products, and Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation Agency 
(TTAMRA) was established in 2002 by the Law No. 4773 and given the mandate to regulate 
and supervise the tobacco, tobacco products, and alcoholic beverages markets. In addition, 
TTAMRA was also assigned to provide social regulation in the sense of developing and 
implementing policies to reduce consumption of the goods under its mandate. As in the case 
of SA, the Board members of TTAMRA are all appointed by the Council of Ministers and 
they are allowed to continue with their existing jobs. However, interestingly enough, there is 
no sunset clause for TTAMRA in Law No. 4773 that established it. 
 
Most recently, in 2002, the Public Procurement Agency (PPA) was established by the Public 
Procurement Law No. 4734. The PPA started its operations in the same year. Its main tasks 
include serving as a complaints office in all matters related to public procurement for all 
affected parties; developing and enacting all secondary regulations related to public 
procurement as well as designing and developing the form and content of contracts to be 
signed among parties. 
  
Table 1 (see Appendix) provides further details about the structure of Turkish IRAs, 
including information on their statutory independence and accountability. 
 
                                                 
19 However, the terms of the Board members were extended for a period of two years. It is not clear what they 
will be compensated for as the Board as well as other operational units of SA are now officially disbanded.   10
Independence of IRAs: Theoretical Considerations 
 
Independence: The Fundamentals 
 
An initial question to be addressed regarding IRAs is why governments and legislatures 
choose to delegate decision-making powers to authorities that will by design be independent 
from them. After all, IRAs may follow policies that will be different than what the 
governments and legislatures would themselves choose to follow, and it is not evident why 
governments and legislatures would want to forego some of their powers in this manner. 
 
Gilardi (2005), in his review of the literature on the rationales for the establishment of 
IRAs
20, provides the following list as to why IRAs may prove to be preferable to ordinary 
bureaucratic structures: 
 
•  Expertise: IRAs by design have more flexible organizational structures that also provide 
better compensation for their employees, leading to more qualified personnel to work for 
them than those that work for traditional buraucracies; 
•  Flexibility: Their autonomous structures allow IRAs better adjust to changing conditions 
in the industries they regulate; 
•  Decision-making costs. IRAs are not going to be inhibited from making decisions 
regarding industries they regulate in cases where elected governments would tend to stall 
due to uncertainty about political gains and losses of policies; 
•  Credible commitments: IRAs, with their longer time horizons, ameliorate the credibility 
problem that arises due to the fact that commitment by a government to a regulatory 
policy in a particular industry (for example, one that promises fair return to long-term 
investments by private agents) cannot be guaranteed to last beyond the following election 
as the new government may have different preferences over outcomes in that industry; 
•  Stability: IRAs also imply a more stable policy environment even in the absence of 
credibility problems (due to, for example, high likelihood that the same government 
remains in power over several elections) as the rules and regulations will less likely be 
subject to sudden and unexpected changes; 
                                                 
20 See Majone 1994, 1999, 2001; Horn 1995; Moe 1990; OECD 2002: 95.   11
•  Economic efficiency: The better regulatory environment resulting from (i)-(v) above will 
lead to better economic performance in markets subject to regulation; 
•  Public participation and transparency: IRAs embody more open and transparent 
decision-making processes than those of ordinary bureaucratic structures, and therefore 
are more open democratic control by consumers and ordinary citizens; 
•  Blame shifting: IRAs shield politicians from blame when unpopular decisions are taken or 
when regulatory failures occur; 
•  Political uncertainty: IRAs provide the politicians with a vehicle to lock in policies that 
they favor beyond their term of office as the policies of IRAs are by their nature more 
difficult to interfere with. 
 
Some of the points in the list above involve normative prescriptions indicating why IRAs 
should be preferred in favor of other type of regulatory bodies, while others involve positive 
predictions indicating why we would expect politicians to choose delegating some of their 
authority to IRAs. Of the points raised in the list above, the two that have received a lot of 
emphasis in recent work on delegation are the credibility problem and the uncertainty 
problem (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Huber and Shipan 2004; Miller 2005). 
 
The Credibility Problem and the Independence of IRAs 
 
The credibility and the time inconsistency problem that governments face in implementing 
their policies was first pointed at systematically by Kydland and Prescott (1977), where the 
issue was how to conduct monetary policy. Should the governments exercise discretion and 
adopt their monetary policies to current conditions, or conduct policy on the basis of fixed 
rules (“rules versus discretion”)? They pointed out that there was a potential conflict between 
policy-makers discretion and policy optimality, and they argued that the ensuing problem 
could be ameliorated if the policy makers could credibly commit themselves to a fixed and 
pre-announced course of action. Policy-makers discretion can lead to time inconsistent 
policies, because (i) policy-makers will change their policies over time to adapt them to new 
information (which was not available at the time initial decision was made); (ii) their 
preferences may change (a new government, new public opinion etc.). 
   12
Time inconsistency problem arises in politics as a consequence of the lack of well-defined 
political property rights: the right to exercise public authority does not belong to anyone; 
public authority is only temporarily attached to those who win elections (Moe (1990)). There 
is an inherent uncertainty in the democratic political process: “whatever today’s authorities 
create stands to be subverted or perhaps completely destroyed – quite legally and without 
compensation whatever – by tomorrow’s authorities” (Moe 1990: 227). 
 
When the success of policy relies ultimately on the response of rational individuals, even a 
policy that has been adopted with best of intentions for the benefit of the collective good may 
be rendered ineffective by rational actors that anticipate the future moves of policy-makers 
who would want to change these policies when new contingencies arise. Policies that are 
rendered time-inconsistent due to expectations of rational agents suffer from a lack of 
credibility. Time inconsistent policies are not credible because rational actors know that they 
are subject to revision. It is very difficult for elected politicians to be credible, because they 
have a very short time horizon, namely the next election. Also, a legislature cannot bind the 
following legislatures, nor a majority a subsequent majority. Hence the coherence of policies 
over time is jeopardized. 
 
One possible solution to this credibility problem for governments is the delegation of 
competencies to independent agencies. Policy-makers thus give up their discretion and 
commit themselves to more or less fixed rules (Shepsle 1991; Dixit 1996).
21 Independent 
agencies have different incentives and do not suffer from the short time horizon imposed by 
the democratic process. Hence their capacity to credibly commit themselves is much greater 
than that of democratically accountable and elected bodies. 
 
The policy-makers need to be credible especially when they cannot rely on coercion to 
implement their policies (Majone 1997). For example, in the case of foreign direct 
investments, if a government wants to convince foreign investors to invest in its domestic 
firms, it cannot force them, but it has to convince them that its policies will favor their 
investments. Hence it must establish credibility. 
 
                                                 
21 See also Elster (1984) on the strategy of commitment to manipulate the feasible set of alternatives through 
restricting the set of possible actions and changing the reward structure.   13
In addition to time-inconsistency and the related credibility problem, there are, however, 
other political transaction costs that affect political exchange. These costs involve 
informational problems such as adverse selection (hidden information) and moral hazard 
(hidden action), which in turn lead to what are called the “agency losses”. Agency losses 
arise whenever one actor, the principal, delegates some power or competencies to another 
actor, which becomes its agent (Moe 1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1998). Adverse 
selection occurs when the principal cannot be sure that he is selecting the agent that has the 
most appropriate skills or preferences; moral hazard occurs when the agent’s actions cannot 
be perfectly monitored by the principal. 
 
The establishment of independent agencies will give rise to agency problems. The agency 
will tend to pursue its own interests rather than that of the government unless some incentive 
mechanisms are established. While agencies may solve the credibility problem with their 
independence from political influence, agency losses that will inevitably arise due to 
information problems may very well outweigh the credibility gains arising from their 
independence. 
 
Political Uncertainty and Delegation of Authority to IRAs 
 
In addition to the credibility problem, governments may also be willing to give up authority 
to IRAs due to what is called “political uncertainty” (Moe 1990). Political uncertainty refers 
to the possibility that future decision makers will be different from the current ones and will 
in most likelihood want to change the policies adopted by the latter. One way of reducing the 
possibility of policy reversal that will be undesirable from the viewpoint of the current 
decision makers is to make it more difficult to temper with policy by creating an independent 
agency with a mandate that is biased towards keeping the favored policy. 
 
By insulating their favored agencies and programs from the future exercise of public 
authority governments will, of course, “not only be reducing their enemies’ opportunities for 
future control; they will be reducing their own opportunities as well.” (Moe 1990: 227-229). 
That is, creating an independent agency to protect favored policies will affect not only the 
future decision makers but all decision makers, including the one that creates the independent 
agency. In other words, creating the independent agency will also tie the hands of the 
decision maker that creates it.   14
 
It should be noted that the argument regarding the credibility problem and political 
uncertainty argument are partially related to each other as the presence of political 
uncertainty exacerbates the credibility problem. However, as noted by Gilardi (2005), the 
incentive for creating an independent agency is very different in each case. 
 
Independence of IRAs: How to Measure Independence? 
 
In an attempt to operationalize the notion of regulatory independence, Greve (2002) considers 
the following five questions
22:  
 
(i)  Can any minister interfere and overrule the decisions made by the agency in specific 
cases? 
(ii)  Can any minister make strategic decisions regarding the regulation? 
(iii)  Does the same personnel policy and management rules apply as in the central 
administration in general? 
(iv)  Can the minister formulate policy independently of the regulatory agency? 
(v)  Is the regulatory agency financed by government and parliament through the ordinary 
state budget? 
 
The degree of regulatory independence is then related to how many of these questions are 
answered in the negative. 
 
In contrast to Greve’s definition, which only concerns the relationship between the 
independent regulator and government, Smith’s (1997: 1) definition also pays attention to the 
relationship between the regulatory agency and the regulated industry. He defines 
independence for regulators as consisting of the following three elements: 
 
(i)  an arm’s-length relationship with regulated firms, consumers and other interests, 
(ii)  an arm’s-length relationship with political authorities, 
                                                 
22 As cited in Johannsen (2003): 21.   15
(iii)  organizational autonomy, such as earmarked funding and exception from restrictive 
civil service salary rules, that is necessary to establish the requisite expertise and to 
maintain those arm’s-length relationships.  
 
Operationalization of independence 
 
Towards a more detailed operationalization of regulatory independence, Gilardi (2002) 
develops a measure that concentrates on formal (statutory) independence. He draws on 
Kreher’s (1997) operationalization, which uses many of the insights developed for measuring 
central bank independence (Cukierman et al, 1992; Cukierman and Webb, 1995; Kreher, 
1997). 
 
Kreher (1997) introduces the distinction between statutory independence and actual 
independence, as it would not be possible to reduce actual independence to legal status of the 
agencies. Elaborating on Kreher’ (1995) distinction, Gilardi (2002) distinguishes between 
formal  independence and actual independence, and introduces an operationalization of 
formal, or statutory independence. He divides formal (statutory) independence into four 
dimensions: 
 
A.  Status of the head of the agency 
B.  Status of the board members 
C.  Relationship with the government and parliament 
D.  Financial and organizational autonomy. 
 
The status of the head of agency (A) aims to assess how independent the head of agency will 
likely to be in terms of (i) term of office; (ii) who appoints him/her; (iii) the conditions for 
his/her dismissal; (iv) whether he/she can hold other government position; (v) whether the 
appointment is renewable or not; and (vi) whether independence from any other (political or 
otherwise) affiliation is a formal requirement for the appointment. The same indicators are 
used in assessing the independence status of board members (B) as well. Together the head of 
agency and board member status variables aim to assess how independent the executives of 
the agency from undue political influence both at the appointment stage and when they serve 
after being appointed. 
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The relationship with the government and parliament variable (C) aims to capture how 
independent the agency will be from the executive and the legislative branch in its operations.  
The specific indicators cover (i) whether the independence of the agency is formally stated in 
law or not; (ii-iii) the formal obligations of the agency towards the government and the 
parliament; and (iv) whether the decisions of the agency can be overturned by any body other 
than a court. 
 
The last variable covers the financial and organizational autonomy (D) of the agency. The 
indicators cover (i) where the income of the agency comes from; (ii) who controls the budget 
of the agency; (iii) who decides on the agency’s internal organizaiton; and (iv) who is in 
charge of the agency’s personnel policy. 
 
The indicators associated to these variables are presented in Table 2 (See Appendix). In each 
case 0 indicates lowest level of independence and 1 indicates highest level of independence. 
Indicators are first aggregated at the variable level, with equal weights. Then, the variable-
level indices are aggregated, again with equal weights, to arrive at the overall independence 
index. 
 
Independence of IRAs in Turkey 
 
Using Gilardi’s (2002) index described above, we assess the formal independence of Turkish 
regulatory agencies. Table 3 (see Appendix) presents the data on Turkish IRAs pertaining to 
the construction of the independence index under consideration. Table 4 (see Appendix) 
presents the values calculated for the variable-level and the overall independence indices. The 
last two rows on electricity regulators in Italy and the U.K. are from Gilardi (2002) and are 
included for the purpose of comparison. 
 
Table 4 reveals a general tendency regarding the formal independence of Turkish agencies. 
The highest overall independence index value belongs to CA with 0.74 (out of a full value of 
1.00). Including CA, the overall formal independence index values for six out of nine Turkish 
IRAs are in the 0.71-0.74 range. HBRT has an overall independence index of 0.62. The main 
outliers are the two IRAs in the agricultural sector, namely TTAMRA with an overall 
independence index value of 0.39, and the now extinct SA with an index value of 0.23. 
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Comparing the four variable-level indices among themselves, we observe that the values for 
the formal independence indices that involve the appointment stage, i.e. the agency head 
status variable (A) and the board member status variable (B), are in general lower than the 
values for the relationship with government and parliament variable (C) and the financial and 
organizational autonomy variable (D). These last two variables pertain to independence in the 
post appointment stage. 
 
The highest value for the agency head status variable (A) is that of HBRT with 0.78 (out of a 
full value of 1.00), followed by 0.75 of PPA. The values for BRSA, CMB, TA, EMRA, and 
CA fall in the 0.56-0.62 range. The lowest two values are for the two agricultural IRAs, 
namely 0.25 for TTAMRA and 0.20 for SA. The values for the board member status variable 
(B) exactly mimic those for the head status variable as both the head of the agency and board 
members are appointed under exactly the same rules and procedures. The low values for 
TTAMRA and SA stem from the fact that the both the head of agency and boards members 
can be state employees in other offices in government and can keep their positions while 
serving for these agencies. Moreover, there is no formal requirement that they be independent 
and act independently of their other (main) appointments, which in practice translates into 
them serving the ministers that their main appointments are affiliated with. 
 
The highest value for the relationship with the government and parliament variable (C) is 
0.85 (out of a full value of 1.00), which belongs to PPA. PPA is followed by BRSA, CMB, 
TA, EMRA, and CA, all of which have a value of 0.84. HBRT has a value of 0.58 for this 
variable, which is a consequence of the fact that it has to present an annual report to 
government that must be approved, as well as being fully accountable to the parliament. As 
for the agencies in the agricultural sector, TTAMRA has a value of 0.65 for this index, while 
SA has a value of 0.17, which is the lowest among all of the agencies. While the 
independence of TTAMRA as an agency has been stated formally, there is no such statement 
for SA. SA is also fully accountable to the government, while TTAMRA has to present an 
annual report for information only. Both agencies have the same type of responsibility 
towards the parliament (to present an annual report for information only). As for who can 
overturn their decisions, SA’s decisions can be overturned unconditionally by the 
government, while TTAMRA’s decisions can be overturned by the government with 
qualifications. 
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In terms of financial and organizational autonomy variable (D), CA scores a value of 1.00 
(out of a full value of 1.00). CA does in fact enjoys full autonomy in terms of its income 
source, and financial and personnel decisions. CA is followed by TA with a sub-index value 
of 0.88 in this category (TA’s income source being partially under government control). 
BRSA, CMB, and EMRA all have the value of 0.75 (their internal organization being 
determined by the Council of Ministers). PPA has a value of 0.63 (with its income source 
being partially under government control and its internal organization being determined by 
the Council of Ministers), and HBRT with a value of 0.50 (with its budget under partial 
control of government, in addition to its income source being partially under government 
control and its internal organization being determined by the government). The agricultural 
IRAs again score very low in this variable, both TTAMRA and SA with a value of 0.38. 
 
Observations and Concluding Remarks 
 
Informal, or actual, independence, as opposed to formal independence that is considered in 
this study, is obviously also an important issue. In fact, it will be the most relevant factor 
when the question under consideration is the decision to delegate. However, formal 
independence is the fundamental issue when one studies the creation of IRAs by decision-
makers (Gilardi 2005). Formal independence is a variable that decision-makers are able to 
determine and shape, and it will have considerable impact on how the actual independence of 
an agency will turn out to be.
23 
 
We have noted above that the Turkish administrative structure is concieved in the Turkish 
Constitution as unitary in nature, which entails a strict indivisibility of administration. IRAs, 
with their separate public legal personality and their defining characteristic of 
“independence” are in fact rather “foreign” entities in the Turkish bureaucratic order. 
Therefore, investigating the formal independence granted to them by decision makers at their 
                                                 
23 It should be noted that formal independence may neither be a sufficient nor a necessary condition for actual 
independence of IRAs, as suggested by comparing the independence scores for the Italian and the U.K. 
electricity regulators given in the last two columns of Table 4. We observe that the Italian Autorita displays 
similar features in terms of its formal independence to the Turkish case, values for Italian indices being higher 
for all variables and, hence, in the overall (0.84 for Autorita versus 0.71 for EMRA). The formal independence 
index value calculated for the U.K. regulator OFGEM is lower compared to its Italian and Turkish counterparts 
(0.45). In terms of actual rather than formal independence, casual observation on the state of regulatory practices 
and successes in these countries would, on the other hand, put the U.K ahead of both Italy and Turkey.   19
creation is revealing about the nature of institutional change and transformation in Turkey in 
the aftermath of the sweeping reforms towards liberalization in the 1980s. 
 
Turkey’s addition of IRAs to its institutional structure can perhaps be best explained by its 
close involvement with IMF and the World Bank programs, as well as its long-standing 
accession process with EU. For example, the creation of one of Turkey’s earliest IRAs, 
namely, the Competition Agency, was, to a large extent a consequence of a formal 
requirement in the Custom Union agreement between Turkey and EU that went into effect in 
1995. Although the notion of establishing a competition authority had been discussed in 
Turkey since the 1970s, a competition law establishing the Competition Agency as an IRA, 
could be passed only in 1994. The period during which IRAs proliferated in Turkey has also 
been the time it went through severe financial and economic crises and has had to resort to 
help from IMF and the World Bank, both of which urged and guided the establishment of 
IRAs in various sectors. For example, IMF included expanding the mandate of the newly 
founded BRSA as well as increasing its independence and transparency as a condition in its 
December 1999 standby agreement with Turkey. IMF has also been a significant influence in 
the creation of an IRA for public procurement in 2002. The World Bank, on the other hand, 
were very instrumental in the creation of IRAs in the telecommunications and energy sectors, 
which was stipulated in Turkey’s various credit agreements with the Bank. 
 
The formal independence scores calculated for Turkish IRAs in this study show that most of 
them were granted considerable operational and financial independence when they were 
created. As noted above, this was despite serious legal difficulties stemming from Turkish 
Constitution and administrative law. Strong influence of IMF and the World Bank, as well as 
the impact of EU accession process, cannot be ignored in the establishment of IRAs in 
Turkey with organizational characteristics quite peculiar to its received administrative 
structure. The independence features and the calculated independence scores of six major 
IRAs (namely CBM, BRSA, CA, TA, EMRA, and PPA) are similar to each other and reflect 
the insistance of IMF and the World Bank that a certain organizational form is a prerequisite 
for IRAs. 
 
However, it would be simplistic to conclude that IRAs were created in Turkey solely because 
of dictates of IMF, the World Bank, and EU. Various Turkish governments have noticed the 
adverse effects of liberalization without adequate regulation. They have not been able to   20
design and introduce institutional reforms by themselves and have actively recruited help 
from IMF and the World Bank, and they have tried to use the EU accession process as a 
vehicle to institute change. Necessity of introducing reforms to achieve economic stability 
and growth as well as to enhance credibility and competitiveness in international markets has 
been realized and rather creative methods of reinterpreting the Constitution and 
administrative law in order to allow for independent entities in Turkish administrative 
structure were voluntarily engaged. 
 
There is also evidence that the Turkish decision makers have realized that IRAs could 
provide solutions for problems peculiar to the country’s own markets. For instance, while 
IMF and the World Bank demanded Turkey to liberalize its sugar beet and tobacco markets, 
they did not require the creation of regulatory agencies in these sectors. The establishment of 
the Sugar Agency and the Tobacco, Tobacco Products, and Alcoholic Beverages Markets 
Regulation Agency looks like a purely creative initiative by the Turkish government, 
reluctant to totally give up its presence and control in these sectors since the livelihood of 
millions of Turkish farmers depends on sugar beet and tobacco production. The World 
Bank’s preference to see these two IRAs as transitory agencies, which resulted in inserting a 
conditional sunset clause in the law establishing the Sugar Agency, provides indication that 
that these are not IRAs actually favored by international financial institutions. They are, 
rather, not-so-independent regulatory agencies which the Turkish government has created to 
introduce a new form of state involvement in agricultural markets and to mitigate the effects 
of liberalization promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. Very low across the board 
independence index values calculated above for these to IRAs strongly suggest that Turkish 
decision makers wanted to main oversight and control in these two important sectors. 
 
 
   21
References 
 
Bendor, J., A. Glazer and T. Hammond (2001), "Theories of Delegation", Annual Review of 
Political Science, 4, 235-269 
 
Cukierman, A., S. B. Webb and B. Neyapti (1992), "Measuring the Independence of Central 
Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcomes", World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), pp. 353-398 
 
Cukierman, A. and S. B. Webb (1995), "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International 
Evidence", World Bank Economic Review, 9 (3), 397-423 
 
Dixit, A. K. (1996), The Making of Economic Policy. A Transaction-Cost Politics 
Perspective, The MIT Press. 
 
Elster, J. (1984), Ulysses and the Sirens.  Studies in the Rationality and Irrationality, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gilardi, F. (2002) “Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A 
Comparative Empirical Analysis", Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 6, pp. 873-893 
 
Gilardi, F. (2004) Delegation in Regulatory State: Origins and Diffusion of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Université de 
Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Gilardi, F. (2005) “Evaluating Independent Regulators” in OECD 2005 
 
Greve, C. (2002) Privatisering, regularing og demokrati. Telestyrelsens funktion som 
uafhoengig reguleringsmyndighed. Aarhus Universitetsforlag, Arhus (Magtudrednings 
skriftserie) 
 
Horn, M. J. (1995), The Political Economy of Public Administration. Institutional Choice in 
the Public Sector, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
 
Huber, J. D., and C. R. Shipan. 2004. Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy. Manuscript, 
Columbia University and University of Iowa. 
 
Johannsen, K. (2003) “Regulatory Independence in Theory and Practice 
- a Survey of Independent Energy Regulators in Eight European Countries”, AKF Forlaget, 
AKF (Danish Institute of Governmental Research), Copanhagen.  
 
Karataş, C. (2001) ‘‘Privatization in Turkey: Implementation, Politics of Privatization and 
Performance Results’’. Journal of International Development, 13, pp. 93-121 
 
Kreher, A. (1997), “Agencies in the European Community – A Step Towards Administrative 
Integration in Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 4(2), 225-245. 
 
Kydland, F., and E. C. Prescott (1977), "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans", Journal of Political Economy, 85(1), 73-491. 
   22
Majone, G. (1994) "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe", West European Politics, 17 
(3), pp. 77-101 
 
Majone, G. (1996a), Regulating Europe, Routledge, London. 
 
Majone, G. (1996b), "Temporal Consistency and Political Credibility: Why Democracies 
Need Non-Majoritarian Institutions”, Working Paper RSC No 96/57, Florence, European 
University Institute. 
 
Majone, G. (1997), "Independent Agencies and the Delegation Problem: Theoretical and 
Normative Dimensions", in: Steuenberg, Bernard and Frans van Vught (eds.), Political 
Institutions and Public Policy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 139-156. 
 
Majone, G. (1999) “The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems”, West European 
Politics, 22, 1: 1-24. 
 
Majone, G. (2001), "Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of democratic Governance: 
A Political Transaction-Cost Approach", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
157, pp. 57-78 
 
McCubbins, M. D., R. G. Noll, and B. R. Weingast (1998), “Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy”, in: Newman, P. (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law, Vol. 3, Macmillan, 50-54. 
 
Miller, G. J. 2005. The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models. Annual Review of 
Political Science 8:203-225. 
 
Moe, T. M. (1984), "The New Economics of Organization", American Journal of Political 
Science. 
 
Moe, T. M. (1990), "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story", Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organisation, 6, Special Issue, pp. 213-105. 
 
OECD (2002a) Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries, From Interventionism to Regulatory 
Governance, Paris, France: OECD Publications 
 
Öniş, Z. and Riedel J. (1993) Economic Crises and Long-Term Growth in Turkey. World 
Bank Comparative Macroeconomic Studies. Washinton D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Shepsle, K. A. (1991), "Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government 
Commitment", in: Bourdieu, Pierre and James S. Coleman (eds.), Social Theory for a 
Changing Society, Westview Press, pp. 245-263. 
 
Smith, W. (1997) “Utility Regulatory – the Independence Debate”, Public Policy for the 
Private Sector, the World Bank Group, Note No. 127 
 
Sosay, G. and E. Ü. Zenginobuz (2005) “Independent Regulatory Agencies in Emerging 
Economies”, Boğaziçi University, Research Papers, ISS/EC 2005-10 
   23
Sönmez, Ü. (2004) “Independent Regulatory Agencies: The World Experience and the 
Turkish Case”, Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration, Middle East Technical University, Ankara 
 
Tan, T. (2000) "Bağımsız İdari Otoriteler (Autonomous Administrative Bodies)'' in İ. Atiyas 
(ed.),  Devletin Düzenleyici Rolü: Türkiye'de Elektrik ve Telekomünikasyon Sektörlerinde 
Özelleştirme ve Rekabet (The Regulatory Role of State: Privatization and Competition in 
Turkish Electricity and Telecommunications Industries).  Istanbul: Tesev Yayınları. 
 
Togan, S. (1994) Foreign Trade Regime and Trade Liberalisation in Turkey during 1980's. 
London: Avebury Press. 
 
Togan S. and Balasubramanyam V.N. (eds.) (1996) The Economy of Turkey Since 
Liberalization. London: Palgrave. 
 
TÜSİAD (2002), Bağımsız Düzenleyici Kurumlar ve Türkiye Uygulaması, Yayın No. 
TÜSİAD-T/2002-12/349, İstanbul. 
 
Zenginobuz, E. Ü. (2002) “Uluslararası Karşılaştırmalar (International Comparisons)”, in 
Bağımsız Düzenleyici Kurumlar ve Türkiye Uygulaması (Independent Regulatory Agencies 
and the Case of Turkey), Yayın No. TÜSİAD-T/2002-12/349, İstanbul 
   24
Table 1.1: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey, Finance Sector 
 
 Law/  Date 
of 
Creation 
Sectors Composition  and 
Appointment of 
the Board 











Banking -7  members 
-6 year term 
(renewable) 
 
Nominations by:  
-Minister in charge 
of BDDK 
 
-Special Fund: up to 
three per ten thousand 
of the total assets of 
banks (as reported in 
their balance sheets) 
Audited by a committee appointed 
by the Minister in charge of BDDK 
and consisting of an inspector from 
Court of Accounts, an inspector 
from Ministry of Finance, and an 





























-Special Fund: three 
per thousand of the 
isssuance value of 
capital instruments 
 
-General Budget (if 
necessary) 
Minister in charge of SPK  Regional 
Administrative 
Court   25




Law/ Date of 
Creation 




Appointment of the 
Board 






Law 4502 / 
2000 
Telecommunication -5  members 





-Minister of Industry and 
Trade, and TOBB (Union 






and usage fees 
-One per ten 
























-6 year term (renewable) 
 
-Appointed directly by 
the Council of Minister 
-License fees 
-One percent of 
transmissison fees  
-Contributions from 
up to one per 
thousand of annual 
revenues of 
operators in the 






Council of State   26
Table 1.3: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey, Competition 
 
  Law/ Date of 
Creation 
Sectors Composition  and 
Appointment of the Board 






Law 4054 / 
1994 





-6 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-Competition Authority (4) 
-Minister of Industry and 
Trade (2) 
-Minister in charge of State 
Planning Institute (1) 
-Court of Appeals (1) 
-Council of State (1) 
-Interuniversity Council (1) 
-TOBB (Union of Turkish 
Chambers and Exchanges) (1) 
-Two per thousand of 
registered capitals of 
corporations 
-Five percent of fines 
assessed by RK 




State   27
Table 1.4: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey, Agriculture 
 Law/  Date 
of Creation 
Sectors Composition  and 
Appointment of the 
Board 
Source of Income  Financial Oversight  Judicial 
Oversight 





-5 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-Minister of Industry and 
Trade (1) 
-Minister of Agriculture 
(1) 
-Minister in charge of 
Undersecretariat of 
Foreign Trade (1) 
-Turkish Sugar Factories 
Inc. (1) 
-Union of Turkish Sugar 
Beet Producer 
Cooperatives (1) 
-Private Sugar Companies 
(2) 
-Five per thousand of revenues 



















-5 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-Minister of Finance (1) 
-Minister of Health (1) 





Foreign Trade (1) 
-Union of Turkish 
Chambers of Agriculture 
(1) 
-Minister in charge of 
TEKEL Inc. (1) 
-Four per thousand of revenues 
from tobacco products and 
alcoholic beverages produced 
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Table 1.5: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey, Various 
 
  Law/ Date of 
Creation 
Sectors Composition  and 
Appointment of the 
Board 
Source of Income  Financial Oversight  Judicial Oversight 
The Higher Board 
for Radio and 
Television (HBRT) 






-5 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 





Journalists and Press 
Council (1) 
-National Security 
Council Secretariat (1) 
 
-Annual frequency allocation fees 
from private radio and television 
companies 
-Five percent of advertisement 
revenues of private radio and 
television companies 
-Administrative fines 
-General Budget (if necessary) 
Supreme Supervision 








Law 4734 / 
2002 
All public bodies  -10 members 










-Council of State (1) 
-Court of Accounts (1) 
-Union of Turkish 
Chambers and Exchanges 
(1) 
-Confederation of 
Turkish Employer Unions 
(1) 
-Five per ten thousand of value of 
procurement contracts (to be 
collected from contractors) 
-Fees for filing complaints 
-Income from publications 
--General Budget (if necessary) 
 
 
Court of Accounts  Regional 
Administrative Court 
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Table 2: Formal independence of regulatory agencies: operationalization (Gilardi (2002)) 
 
Variable Indicators  Numerical 
coding 
A) Agency Head Status  1) Term of Office   
  -over 8 years  1.00 
  -6 to 8 years  0.80 
  -5 years  0.60 
  -4 years  0.40 
  -fixed term under 4 at the discretion of the appointer  0.20 
  -no fixed term  0.00 
  2) Who appoints the agency head?   
  -the board members  1.00 
  -a mix of the executive and the legislative  0.75 
  -the legislature  0.50 
  -the executive collectively  0.25 
  -one or two ministers  0.00 
  3) Dismissal   
  -dismissal is impossible  1.00 
  -only for reasons not related to policy  0.67 
  -no specific provisions for dismissal  0.33 
  -at the appointer’s discretion  0.00 
  4) May the agency head hold other offices in government?   
  -no  1.00 
  -only with permission of the executive  0.50 
  -no specific provision  0.00 
  5) Is the appointment renewable?   
  -no  1.00 
  -yes, once  0.50 
  -yes, more than once  0.00 
  6) Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment?   
  -yes  1.00 
  -no  0.00 
B) Board members status  7) Term of Office   
  -over 8 years  1.00 
  -6 to 8 years  0.80 
  -5 years  0.60 
  -4 years  0.40 
  -fixed term under 4 at the discretion of the appointer  0.20 
  -no fixed term  0.00 
  8) Who appoints the board members? 
-the board members 
 
  -the agency head  1.00 
  -a mix of the executive and the legislative  0.75 
  -the legislature  0.50 
  -the executive collectively  0.25 
  -one or two ministers  0.00 
  9) Dismissal   
  -dismissal is impossible  1.00 
  -only for reasons not related to policy  0.67 
  -no specific provisions for dismissal  0.33 
  -at the appointer’s discretion  0.00   30
  10) May the board members hold other offices in 
government? 
 
  -no  1.00 
  -only with permission of the executive  0.50 
  -no specific provision  0.00 
  11) Is the appointment renewable?   
  -no  1.00 
  -yes, once  0.50 
  -yes, more than once  0.00 
  12) Is independence a formal requirement for the 
appointment? 
 
  -yes  1.00 
  -no  0.00 
C) Relationship with 
government and parliament 
13) Is the independence of the agency formally stated?   
  -yes  1.00 
  -no  0.00 
  14) Which are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis 
the government? 
 
  -none  1.00 
  -presentation of annual report for information only  0.67 
  -presentation of an annual report that must be approved  0.33 
  -the agency is fully accountable  0.00 
  15) Which are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis 
the parliament? 
 
  -none  1.00 
  -presentation of annual report for information only  0.67 
  -presentation of an annual report that must be approved  0.33 
  -the agency is fully accountable  0.00 
  16) Who, other than a court, can overturn the agency’s 
decision where it has exclusive competency? 
 
  -none  1.00 
  -a specialized body  0.67 
  -the government, with qualifications  0.33 
  -the government, unconditionally  0.00 
D) Financial and organizational 
autonomy 
17) Which is the source of the agency’s budget?   
  -external funding  1.00 
  -government and regulated firms  0.50 
  -government  0.00 
  18) How is the budget controlled?   
  -by the agency  1.00 
  -by both the government and the agency  0.50 
  -the government 
19) Who decides on the agency’s internal organization? 
0.00 
  -the agency  1.00 
  -the parliament  0.50 
  -the government  0.00 
  20) Who is in charge of the agency’s personnel policy?   
  -the agency  1.00 
  -the government  0.00 
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Table 3: Details on formal independence of Turkish IRAs 
 
    BRSA CMB TA EMRA CA SA TTAMRA HBRT PPA
1) Term of Office  0.80  0.80  0.60  0.80  0.80  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60 
2) Who appoints the 
agency head?  0.25 0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.75 0.25 
3) Dismissal  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.33  0.33  0.67  0.33  0.67 
4) May the agency 
head hold other 
offices in 
government? 
1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 1.00 
5) Is the 
appointment 
renewable? 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 1.00  1.00 
A) Agency 
Head Status 
6) Is independence a 
formal requirement 
for the appointment? 
1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00 0.00 1.00  1.00 
7) Term of Office  0.80  0.80  0.60  0.80  0.80  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60 
8) Who appoints the 
board members?  0.25 0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.75 0.25 
9) Dismissal  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.33  0.33  0.67  0.33  0.67 
10) May the board 
members hold other 
offices in 
government? 
1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 1.00 
11) Is the 
appointment 
renewable? 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 1.00 
B) Board 
members status 
12) Is independence 
a formal requirement 
for the appointment? 
1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 1.00 
13) Is the 
independence of the 
agency formally 
stated? 
1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 
14) Which are the 
formal obligations of 
the agency vis-à-vis 
the government? 
0.67 0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.00  0.67  0.33 0.67 
15) Which are the 
formal obligations of 
the agency vis-à-vis 
the parliament? 





16) Who, other than 
a court, can overturn 
the agency’s 
decision where it has 
exclusive 
competency? 
1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.33  1.00 1.00 
17) Which is the 
source of the 
agency’s budget? 
1.00 1.00  0.50  1.00  1.00  0.50  1.00  0.50 0.50 
18) How is the 
budget controlled?  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.50  0.50 1.00 
19) Who decides on 
the agency’s internal 
organization? 





20) Who is in charge 
of the agency’s 
personnel policy? 
1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  1.00 1.00 
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Table 4: Formal independence of Turkish regulatory agencies 
 























0.62 0.62  0.84  0.75  0.71 
Capital Markets 
Board (CMB)  0.62 0.62  0.84  0.75  0.71 
Telecommunications 




0.62 0.62  0.84  0.75  0.71 
Competition Agency 
(CA)  0.56 0.56  0.84  1.00  0.74 






0.25 0.25  0.67  0.38  0.39 
The Higher Board 
for Radio and 
Television (HBRT) 
0.78 0.78  0.58  0.50  0.62 
Public Procurement 
Agency (PPA)  0.75 0.75  0.85  0.63  0.74 
          
Autorita per 
l’nergia elettrica e il 
gas (Italy)* 
0.81 0.81  0.84  0.84  0.84 
Office for gas and 
electricity markets 
(OFGEM, U.K)* 
0.21 0.21  0.67  0.75  0.45 
*From Gilardi (2002). 
 
 